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Abstract
We study the welfare effect of language barriers in communication. Specifically,
we compare the equilibrium welfare in a game with language barriers to that in the
equivalent game without language barriers. We show how and why language barri-
ers may (weakly) improve welfare by providing two positive results. First, in a game
with any language barriers, we prove that if we allow for N-dimensional communi-
cation, any equilibrium outcome of the equivalent game without language barriers
can be replicated. Second, for any payoff primitive, we provide a welfare ranking for
several noisy-communication devices, including language barriers, that generalizes
the results in Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009). In particular, our re-
sults imply that there always exist some language barriers whose maximal equilibrium
welfare (always weakly and sometimes strictly) dominates any noisy-talk equilibrium
(and hence also any cheap-talk equilibrium) under no language barriers.
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1 Introduction
Communication is often about transmission of information, so that a natural question to
ask is “what” information is actually transmitted and this has been the focus of the liter-
ature on strategic communication, or “cheap talk.” This literature, however, has typically
ignored the issue of “how” information is transmitted. Yet, everyday experience suggests
that how information is transmitted may both hinder or help communication. For in-
stance, it is notoriously hard to convey humor or any other emotion in modern electronic
communication, and emoticons were developed as a response to the problem (Curran
and Casey (2006)). Similarly, there is a concern that patients may not be able to under-
stand medical jargon, so that the common recommendation is not to release to patients
their medical records or at least avoid jargon when this is likely to cause misunderstand-
ings (see Ross and Lin (2003) for a survey of the medical literature on this issue).1 In
this paper, we take the “how” issue seriously, and study a model with “language types,”
as introduced by Blume and Board (2013), which allows us to model the possibility of
“language barriers” within a strategic communication setting.
In the canonical Crawford and Sobel (1982) sender-receiver setting, it is implicitly
assumed that all participants have perfect language ability. In contrast to this standard
framework, Blume and Board (2013) introduce “language types” for both sender and re-
ceiver which describe, respectively, the sets of messages that can be sent and that can be
understood.2 This provides a parsimonious way to study a fundamental question: do
language barriers improve or harm welfare or, equivalently, is equilibrium welfare under
language barriers greater or smaller than that under no language barriers? We pursue
this fundamental question in two directions. We first ask: is there a communication pro-
tocol that can guarantee that any language barriers won’t impact negatively on welfare?
We then ask: for any payoff primitive, can we find some language barriers that (weakly)
1Additional examples are discussed in Blume and Board (2013) and Blume (2018). We should also point
out that the literature on organizations has paid significant attention to the “how” issue in communication,
at least since Arrow (1975). Garicano and Prat (2013) provide a survey of the recent literature.
2When we say a receiver’s language type represents the set of messages she understands, we mean that
she can distinguish all messages in such a set and thus condition her actions on each of those messages.
However, she cannot distinguish any two messages that do not belong to her language type (they all appear
to be the same “nonsense” to her). Therefore, she must choose the same action in response to any such
“nonsense” (see details in Section 2).
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improve equilibrium welfare, even if we stick to the canonical communication protocol?
We provide positive answers to both questions.
Our first main result is inspired by a phenomenon that we observe in real-life com-
munication, which is that messages are formed by combining basic units to make com-
plex structures that convey meaning. Thus, it seems restrictive to assume a fixed number
of messages in modeling communication, each message with a predetermined level of
complexity, rather than assuming that such messages can always be used as building
blocks capable of forming more sophisticated structures. The communication protocol
in Blume and Board (2013) implicitly forbids forming more complex structures than the 1-
dimensional messages in a set M, so we relax this assumption in the simplest way possible
by assuming that the set of available messages extends to MN (for some integer N). Our
first main result is that, under some minimal assumptions, any equilibrium which would
obtain in a game with 1-dimensional communication and no language barriers can be
replicated by an equilibrium of the same game if we add any language barriers (indepen-
dent of payoff states) but allow for N-dimensional communication (for sufficiently large
N), i.e., language barriers do not harm welfare under multi-dimensional communication.
To achieve this result, we need to overcome three technical difficulties under lan-
guage barriers: (1) the sender may not know the receiver’s language type; (2) the receiver
may not know the sender’s language type; (3) there may not be enough common mes-
sages (between sender and receiver) to transmit useful information. It is straightforward
to see that multi-dimensional communication overcomes the third difficulty, because the
set of common messages expands as we increase the dimension of messages. The novelty
of our equilibrium construction comes from how it overcomes the first two difficulties,
although it does so in a way that resembles real-life solutions to similar problems. In par-
ticular, in our equilibrium construction, a sender partitions her N-dimensional message
into several blocks of sub-messages, with each block intended for a specific language type
of the receiver. We show that this overcomes the first difficulty just as businesses - which
sell the same product in different countries - solve the problem of communicating with
customers who speak different languages by producing an instruction manual with the
same instructions written in all the relevant languages. In addition, in our construction,
each block of sub-messages from the sender is further divided into two parts, with one
part voluntarily revealing the sender’s language type, and the other part transmitting
payoff-relevant information (using type-specific common messages). The part where the
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sender’s language type is revealed overcomes the second difficulty, just as people some-
times add a “smiley face” emoticon in an email message to ensure the content is not taken
too seriously.3
In the second part of the paper, we tackle the second question in the context of 1-
dimensional communication. In particular, we compare welfare across several protocols
for cheap-talk communication. Our main result is a linear ranking of the maximal welfare
achieved in these different protocols:
ΦLB  ΦM  ΦILB  ΦN
where ΦLB, ΦM, ΦILB, ΦN are the maximal equilibrium welfare achieved in a generic
sender-receiver game under language barriers, mediation, language barriers with the
restriction that language types are distributed independently of payoff states (we refer
to these as independent language barriers from now on), and noisy talk, respectively.
Both Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) and Blume and Board (2010) ask
a similar question assuming quadratic preferences and the uniform payoff distribution,
and (together) establish the welfare equivalence result, ΦM = ΦILB = ΦN. Instead, we
show that equilibria with language barriers, mediation, independent language barriers
and noisy talk correspond to a series of increasingly restrictive incentive compatibility
conditions (in that order), which generate the welfare order described above. Thus, our
results go beyond the environment with quadratic preferences and the uniform payoff
distribution and indeed hold for any general preference and distributional assumptions.
This greater generality allows us to show, through an example (Example 2A available in
Giovannoni and Xiong (2018)), that in some environments ΦILB > ΦN, thus breaking the
welfare equivalence established by Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) and
Blume and Board (2010).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Sec-
tion 3 studies N-dimensional communication; Section 4 focuses on 1-dimensional com-
munication; Section 5 reviews the related literature; Section 6 concludes.
3Or, equivalently, the sender uses a part of her message - the “smiley face” - to identify herself as the
“humorous” type and not the “serious” type.
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2 Model
Following Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Blume and Board (2013), we consider a sender-
receiver model of communication throughout the paper. That is, I = f1, 2g denotes the
set of players, where player 1 is a sender and player 2 is a receiver. Player 1 privately
observes a payoff state t 2 T, and player 2 takes a payoff-relevant action a 2 A. Every
agent i 2 I has a utility function ui : T  A  ! R. Throughout the paper, a subscript i
refers to agent i, whereas no subscript refers to all agents.
Let M denote the set of possible messages. For simplicity, assume T [ M [ A  R.
For every i 2 I, we use a non-empty Λi  2M f?g to denote the set of language types
of agent i. Each language type λi 2 Λi is defined as the set of messages that agent i
understands. Define Λ = Λ1  Λ2. There is a common prior π 2 4 (T Λ), and πT
and πΛ denote the corresponding marginal distributions. Let π ( jt, λ1) and π ( jλ2)
denote the distributions of λ2 and (t, λ1) conditional on (t, λ1) and λ2, respectively. We
will sometimes impose the following assumption, and we will state it explicitly if we do.
Assumption 1 t 2 T and λ 2 Λ are independently distributed under π.
We use jXj to denote the cardinality of a set X. Throughout the paper, we assume





For a positive integer N, we define an N-dimensional communication game. Before
the game starts, nature chooses a state-type profile (t, λ) according to π. Then, upon
privately observing (t, λ1) 2 T  Λ1, player 1 sends an N-dimensional message m 2
(λ1)
N to player 2. Finally, upon privately observing [λ2, m], player 2 takes an action a 2 A.
Thus, a game is defined by a tuple


M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui : T  A  ! R)i2I , N

, and
players’ strategies in the game are
player 1 : σ : T Λ1 ! MN,
player 2 : ρ : Λ2  MN ! A,
such that σ and ρ are regular with respect to Λ1 and Λ2, respectively.4 Regularity for σ
4For notational ease, we focus on pure strategies. The analysis can be easily extended to mixed strategies
but at the cost of significantly more notation.
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means that σ (t, λ1) 2 (λ1)N for every (t, λ1) 2 T  Λ1. The interpretation is that a lan-
guage type λ1 of the sender understands only the messages with which she is endowed,
and hence this type can only send a vector message where each component is in λ1. This
restriction defines “language barriers” for the sender.
We define the regularity for ρ as follows. For any x, y 2 M, we say that x λ2 y if and
only if x = y 2 λ2 or fx, yg \ λ2 = ?. That is, type λ2 can distinguish any two messages
in λ2, but treats all the other messages as a single and distinct “nonsense” message. Then,








2 MK, we say that
x λ2 y if and only if xk λ2 yk, 8k 2 f1, ..., Kg.5 Then, regularity of ρ requires
m λ2 m









2 Λ2  MN  MN.
(1) says that the receiver’s strategy must be measurable with respect to his language type,
which captures “language barriers” for the receiver.
Given a strategy profile (σ, ρ) and a state-type profile (t, λ), define
Ui (σ, ρjt, λ) = ui ( t, ρ [λ2, σ (t, λ1)]) , 8i 2 I,
i.e., Ui (σ, ρjt, λ) is the final utility of agent i given [(σ, ρ) , (t, λ)]. We adopt the solution
concept defined as follows.
Definition 1 (σ, ρ) is an equilibrium ifZ
Λ2

U1 (σ, ρ j t, λ) U1
 
σ0, ρ j t, λ






U2 (σ, ρ j t, λ) U2
 
σ, ρ0 j t, λ

π [d (t, λ1) jλ2]  0, 8λ2 2 Λ2, 8ρ0. (3)
I.e., we adopt the standard notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium applied to this spe-
cific setup, where (2) and (3) describe incentive compatibility conditions for the players.
Throughout the paper, we impose the following necessary assumptions for informative
communication:6
jλ1j  2, 8λ1 2 Λ1, (4)
λ1 \ λ2 6= ?, 8 (λ1, λ2) 2 Λ. (5)
5We use “x λ2 y” to denote that “x λ2 y” is false.
6If (4) is violated, we have jλ1j = 1, i.e., sender λ1 always sends the same message, which is not infor-
mative. If (5) is violated, receiver λ2 always gets the “nonsense” message from λ1, which is not informative.
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3 Main Results: N-dimensional Communication
We study N-dimensional communication in this section, and prove that any equilibrium
in a communication game with no language barriers can be replicated by an equilibrium
of the corresponding game with language barriers as long as we allow for messages of a
sufficiently high dimension. In Section 3.1, we first define what this means formally, while
in Section 3.2, we state our main result, discuss the intuition behind our construction and
provide a proof.
3.1 Similar games and outcome-equivalent equilibria
We will compare equilibria between communication games which differ only on language
barriers. To make the comparison between two such games meaningful, they must be
“similar”, which means that they must share the same primitives (actions, payoff states,
etc.), but may differ in language types and the dimension of messages they send.
Definition 2 Two games bG and G





M, T, Λ, π, A,
 





are similar, denoted by “ bG  G”, ifD bM, bT, bA, (bui)i2IE = 
M, T, A, (ui)i2I and bπbT = πT.
We now define outcome-equivalent equilibria in two similar games.
Definition 3 Given two similar games, bG and G, an equilibrium (bσ,bρ) in bG is outcome-equivalent
to an equilibrium (σ, ρ) in G if
bρ hbλ2, bσ t, bλ1i = ρ λ2, σ  t, λ1 , 8 t, bλ, λ 2 T  bΛΛ.
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Outcome-equivalent equilibria in similar games induce the same action for any
given payoff state, regardless of language types. As a result, they induce the same ex-
post utility for every player.7
3.2 Outcome-equivalence for similar games
Let G denote the set of all standard communication games with 1-dimensional messages
and no language barriers, i.e.,
G 
8<:DM, T, Λ, π, A, (ui : T  A  ! R)i2I , NE : λi  M, Λi  fλi g ,Λ = ∏i2I Λi , N  1
9=; .
For any eΛ and any positive integer eN, define
G(eΛ, eN)  n
M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui : T  A  ! R)i2I , N : (Λ, N) = eΛ, eNo ,
i.e., G(eΛ, eN) contains all eN-dimensional communication games with language structure eΛ.
For an equilibrium (σ, ρ) in a game


M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui : T  A  ! R)i2I , N

, define
E (σ,ρ)  fσ (t, λ1) : t 2 T and λ1 2 Λ1g ,
i.e., E (σ,ρ) is the set of messages player 1 sends in the equilibrium. We say (σ, ρ) is a finite-
message equilibrium if
E (σ,ρ) < ∞ and an infinite-message equilibrium otherwise.
For simplicity, we focus on finite-message equilibria here, but our analysis can be easily
extended to infinite-message equilibria, as is done in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 1 Given Assumption 1, for any Λ and any finite-message equilibrium (σ, ρ) in a
game G 2 G, a positive integer N exists, such that in any game G 2 [NNG(Λ,N) with
G  G, there exists an equilibrium (σ, ρ) of G that is outcome-equivalent to (σ, ρ).
We now proceed to first provide some intuition for our multi-dimensional construc-
tion behind Theorem 1 and then provide a proof. In Appendix B.1 we also discuss its
application to common-interest games.
7In a sense, our positive result based on this ex-post outcome equivalence notion implies that language
types do not matter at all. One could also adopt a weaker notion of outcome-equivalence: the induced joint
distribution on payoff types and actions are the same. Clearly, our main result would still hold under this
weaker notion.
8
3.2.1 The role of N-dimensionality in Theorem 1
To guarantee effective communication, we need to tackle three difficulties: (1) the sender
may not know the receiver’s language type; (2) the receiver may not know the sender’s
language type; (3) there may not be enough common messages between sender and re-
ceiver to transmit information. In this section, we leave incentive compatibility aside,
and show that sufficiently many dimensions enable players to tackle all of the difficulties.
We return to incentive compatibility in the next section, and prove Theorem 1 by showing
that players are indeed willing to utilize such abilities to achieve effective communication.
First difficulty: the receiver’s language type is his private information. The sender
can partition a N-dimensional message into jΛ2j blocks, with each block intended for a
language type of the receiver. Specifically, suppose N = N0  jΛ2j for some integer N0,









, where mλ2 2
MN
0
is the intended message from the sender to λ2. Upon receiving m, the language
type λ2 just goes to his designated block to retrieve his intended message mλ2 . Thus,
messages with multiple dimensions do more than just increase the size of the message
space. As an example, consider the following common-interest game. Suppose that T =
A = fα, β, γ, δg and u1 (t, a) = u2 (t, a) = 1 if a = t and zero otherwise. Let







λ1 = Z; λ 2 = f 1, 2, ...g ; λ
+
2 = f1, 2, ...g ;
Suppose every (t, λ1, λ2) 2 T  Λ1  Λ2 has positive probability. Since the sender and
the receiver have identical preferences, the only issue is how the sender can communi-
cate her information to the receiver. Clearly, without language barriers, the efficient out-
come (i.e., full communication) is an equilibrium. An efficient equilibrium under these
language barriers requires that both λ 2 and λ
+
2 be able to distinguish between each of
the equilibrium messages from the sender in each of the states. But for this to occur, at
least three of the four messages must be in λ 2 , and at least three of the four must be in
λ+2 , which is impossible. It is worth noting that
λ1 \ λ 2  = λ1 \ λ+2  = jZj, i.e., the
sender and the receiver always share infinitely-many common messages, but full com-
munication still fails. However, we can achieve full communication even if we restrict λ1
to the set f 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3g , but allow for 2-dimensional messages. Then, the sender
can produce a message (m  (t) , m+ (t)) where m  and m+ are the blocks that describe
9
the payoff relevant information for λ 2 and λ
+
2 , respectively.
8 Thus, the ability to use
two-dimensional messages (rather than the number of common messages) is the key to
improve communication.
Second difficulty: the sender’s language type is her private information. Consider the
following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.1:
Lemma 1 For any λ2 2 Λ2 and any
N > 3+ jΛ1j , (6)
there exists a function Υλ2 : Λ1  ! MN such that
Υλ2 [λ1] 2 (λ1)
N , 8λ1 2 Λ1,









Suppose the sender follows Υλ2 in Lemma 1 to reveal her language type to type λ2
of the receiver: if the sender is of type λ1, she sends Υλ2 [λ1] 2 (λ1)
N to type λ2. For any
two distinct language types, λ01 and λ
00









, sent by λ01 and λ
00
1 , respectively, i.e., the sender’s language types
are fully revealed. To see the idea, consider the following example where now it is the
receiver that is uncertain about the sender’s language type. Here T = A = fα, βg and
u1 (t, a) = u2 (t, a) = 1 if a = t and zero otherwise. Let








λ2 = f1, 2, 3g ; λ01 = f1, 2g ; λ001 = f2, 3g ; λ0001 = f1, 3g
Suppose every (t, λ1, λ2) 2 T Λ1 Λ2 has positive probability. As in the previous ex-
ample, without language barriers the efficient (full-communication) outcome is an equi-
librium but, again, this does not hold for these particular language barriers. To see this,
8For instance, there is an equilibrium where the blocks m  and m+ are described by
m  (α) =  1, m  (β) =  2, m  (γ) =  3, m+ (δ) = 1,
m+ (α) = 1, m+ (β) = 2, m+ (γ) = 3, m+ (δ) =  1,
i.e., type λ 2 can understand m
  (α), m  (β) and m  (γ), while type λ+2 can understand m
+ (α), m+ (β) and
m+ (γ). For both language types, the message they cannot understand corresponds to δ.
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suppose otherwise. Then, to achieve efficiency for λ01, states α and β must be truthfully
revealed by messages 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, suppose λ2 plays α and β upon
receiving messages 1 and 2, respectively. As a result, if λ2 plays α upon receiving message
3, then efficiency is not achieved for λ0001 ; if λ2 plays β upon receiving message 3, then ef-
ficiency is not achieved for λ001 - we get a contradiction. Nevertheless, because of Lemma





nication, exists.9 In such an equilibrium, the first component, mλ identifies the sender’s
language type while the second component identifies the payoff state. As in the previ-
ous example, giving arbitrary additional messages to each sender type would not work
because the receiver would not be able to understand such messages.
Final difficulty: not enough common messages. Once asymmetry of information about
language types is resolved, the following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.2, helps
us resolve the final difficulty.
Lemma 2 For any (λ1, λ2) 2

2M f?g
2 and any finite-message equilibrium (σ, ρ) in a
game G 2 G and any bN > E (σ,ρ) , (8)
there exists a function Γ(λ1,λ2) : E
(σ,ρ)  ! (λ1)
bN such that for any m, m0 2 E (σ,ρ),





By the previous two steps, both the sender’s and the receiver’s language types can
be truthfully revealed. Given this, suppose sender λ1 follows Γ(λ1,λ2) to send messages to
receiver λ2, and Γ(λ1,λ2) translates equilibrium messages in E
(σ,ρ) to i’s endowed mes-
sages in (λ1)
bN. Then, for any two distinct messages m, m0 in E (σ,ρ), because of (9), re-
ceiver λ2 can distinguish the two translated messages, Γ(λ1,λ2) (m) and Γ(λ1,λ2) (m
0). That
is, equilibrium messages are effectively transmitted.
















































= (3, 1) ,
37775
receiver’s strategy: choose α if messages in the two dimensions match, and β otherwise.
1CCCCCCA
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3.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix any game G without language barriers and any finite-message equilibrium (σ, ρ)
in G. Consider N =

N + bN  jΛ2j, where N and bN are defined in (6) and (8), re-
spectively. We now define a strategy profile (σ, ρ), and show it is an equilibrium in the
N -dimensional communication game which is similar to G.
The sender’s strategy: let mλ2 denote the message intended from the sender to type
λ2 of the receiver. For every (t, λ1) 2 T Λ1, define










2 MN . (10)
I.e., type λ1 of the sender tells type λ2 of the receiver about the sender’s true language type
via Υλ2 [λ1] as described in Lemma 1 and the equilibrium message σ
 (t) under (σ, ρ)
via Γ(λ1,λ2) [σ
 (t)] as described in Lemma 2.
The receiver’s strategy: fix any et 2 T. Upon receiving the intended message mλ2
from the sender, type λ2 of the receiver uses the following function to translate it back to







σ ( t ) ,
if there exists (t, λ1) 2 T Λ1 such that
mλ2 =






  et  , otherwise, (11)
where et is fixed above. Note that, by Lemmas 1 and 2, if there exist multiple (t, λ1) 2
T  Λ1 such that mλ2 =

Υλ2 [λ1] , Γ(λ1,λ2) [σ
 (t)]

, then λ1 must be unique, and all of



















for some t0 2 T, (12)





N , where mλ2 is the message
from the sender to type λ2 of the receiver, we have






, 8λ2 2 Λ2. (13)
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Given the receiver playing ρ, any message of the sender would induce some equilibrium
action under (σ, ρ) . As immediately implied by (12) and (13),






for some t0 2 T, (14)
To sum up, under (σ, ρ) and any given (t, λ1) 2 T  Λ1, each sender’s type λ1
follows σ (t) by sending two pieces of information, Υλ2 [λ1] and Γ(λ1,λ2) [σ
 (t)], to each
receiver’s type λ2, where the former truthfully reveals λ1, and the latter is the message
σ (t) coded via Γ(λ1,λ2) by using the messages available to λ1. Upon receiving the mes-
sage, each receiver λ2 decodes it back to σ (t), and plays the action ρ [σ (t)]. As a result,
ρ [σ (t)] = ρ [λ2, σ (t, λ1)] , 8 [t, (λ1, λ2)] 2 T Λ,
i.e., (σ, ρ) and (σ, ρ) are outcome-equivalent. Finally, we show incentive compatibility
for both players.
Incentive compatibility for the sender. Suppose the true payoff state is t. Under (σ, ρ)
in the game without language barriers, sending σ (t) is optimal for the sender. Under
(σ, ρ) in theN -dimensional communication game, the equilibrium message of the sender
is interpreted by the receiver as σ (t). If the sender deviates to any other message m 2
MN , by (14), it will be interpreted as σ (t 0) for some t
0
and this is (weakly) worse than
σ (t) for the sender under state t.
Incentive compatibility for the receiver. The receiver in an equilibrium (σ, ρ) of the
game without language barriers forms a posterior belief on t upon receiving the messages
σ (t) and chooses the optimal strategy ρ [σ (t)]. Note that the receiver in equilibrium
(σ, ρ) of the N -dimensional game with language barriers receives two pieces of informa-
tion, truthfully reported by the sender in the equilibrium, i.e., λ1 and σ (t). Since t and
λ are independent by Assumption 1, the receiver forms the same posterior belief on t as
that under (σ, ρ). Hence, the same strategy ρ [λ2, σ (t, λ1)] = ρ [σ (t)] is a best reply
for the receiver. 
4 Main Results: 1-dimensional Communication
In this section, we focus on 1-dimensional communication to study whether there exist
language barriers that allow us to do “better” than what we can achieve without them.
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In particular, we follow the Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) strategy
of studying several modified versions of cheap-talk communication games, although the
games studied here generalize theirs over two dimensions: we consider any arbitrary dis-
tribution and any utility functions, while Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009)
focus on the continuous uniform distribution and the quadratic utility function.10 In Sec-
tion 4.1, we define mediation equilibria (Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009)),
noisy-talk equilibria (Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007)), and language-barrier equi-
libria, all of which may Pareto dominate cheap-talk equilibria. In Section 4.2, we provide
a linear ranking regarding the maximal welfare induced by these equilibria.
4.1 Cheap talk communication devices
Recall that a communication game is defined by a tuple


M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui)i2I , N

. From
now on, we fix the primitives (excluding language barriers),


M, T, πT, A, (ui)i2I , N = 1

,
so as to make comparisons meaningful. We define three communication devices.
Mediation equilibria. First, we define mediation equilibria.11
Definition 4 [p : T  ! 4 (A)] is a mediation equilibrium ifZ
a2A
u1 [t, a] p (t) (da) 
Z
a2A









u2 [t, a] p (t) (da)




u2 [t, ι (a)] p (t) (da)
35πT [dt] , 8ι : A  ! A.
(16)
10Blume and Board (2010) also undertook an exercise similar to ours. However, they focused on the
Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) class of games so that our results, which consider more
general settings, differ.
11In Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009), [p : T  ! 4 (A)] is called an arbitration equilib-
rium if and only if condition (15) holds. Clearly, a mediation equilibrium is also an arbitration equilibrium,
and hence, the maximal utility of arbitration equilibria (weakly) dominates that of mediation equilibria.
However, a general welfare comparison between arbitration equilibria and language-barrier equilibria is
not available (see Giovannoni and Xiong (2018) for a detailed discussion).
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Suppose there is a non-strategic mediator besides the players, who follows [p : T  ! 4 (A)]
to make recommendations. The sender reports his private payoff state t to the mediator;
upon receiving t, the latter commits to drawing from a lottery on A following the distri-
bution p (t); given every realized value a of the lottery, the receiver plays a. A mediation
equilibrium requires incentive compatibility of reporting t and playing a by the sender
and the receiver, respectively, which are summarized in (15) and (16).
Noisy-talk equilibria. In a noisy-talk game, on top of the primitives, we have a
tuple (ε, ξ) 2 [0, 1]  4 (M), which has the interpretation that with probability ε, the
sender’s message is replaced by a random message which is the realization of an exoge-
nous and independent distribution ξ. A potential candidate for a noisy-talk equilibrium
is a strategy profile
([s : T  ! 4 (M)] , [r : M  ! 4 (A)]) .
Given [(ε, ξ) , s, r], type t of the sender follows s (t) 2 4 (M) to send a random mes-
sage; for any realized message m from the sender, with probability (1  ε), the receiver
observes m, and with probability ε, the receiver observes a random message generated by
the distribution ξ; finally, upon receiving a (possibly distorted) message m0, the receiver
takes a random action r (m0) 2 4 (A). We aggregate this process as follows.
p[(ε,ξ), s, r] : T  ! 4 (A) , (17)
p[(ε,ξ), s, r] (t) [E] =
Z
M
24(1  ε) r (m) [E] + ε Z
M
r ( em) [E] ξ [d em]
35 s (t) [dm] , 8E  A,
i.e., p[(ε,ξ), s, r] (t) is the ex-post action distribution induced by (s, r), given t. We now define
noisy-talk equilibria.
Definition 5 ([s : T  ! 4 (M)] , [r : M  ! 4 (A)]) is a noisy-talk equilibrium if there ex-
ists (ε, ξ) 2 [0, 1]4 (M) such that
8t 2 T, 8s0 : T  ! 4 (M) , (18)Z
a2A
u1 (t, a) p[(ε,ξ), s, r] (t) (da) 
Z
a2A
u1 (t, a) p[(ε,ξ), s
0, r] (t) (da) ,
15




u2 (t, a) p[(ε,ξ), s, r] (t) (da)




u2 (t, a) p[(ε,ξ), s, r
0] (t) (da)
35πT [dt] .
(18) and (19) in Definition 5 describe the incentive compatibility conditions for the
sender and the receiver, respectively. It is worth noting that our notion of noisy talk is the
one utilized in Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) where the probability of
error ε is fixed and independent of messages. Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) also
consider an alternative notion of noisy talk in which error probabilities are not fixed but
are correlated with messages. Our welfare ranking results (i.e., Theorem 2 and Lemma 4)
hold for the fixed-noise version of noisy talk, but not the correlated-noise version.12
Language-barrier equilibria. A valid language-barrier game is defined by a tuple
[Λ, π 2 4 (T Λ)] such that the marginal distribution of π on T matches the fixed πT
and assumptions (4) and (5) are satisfied. In game [Λ, π], a potential candidate for a
language-barrier equilibrium is a strategy profile
[σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] .
We say [σ, ρ] is a valid strategy profile if and only if σ and ρ are regular with respect to
Λ1 and Λ2, respectively, where regularity is as defined in Section 2. Given (t, λ1, λ2), the
sender follows σ (t, λ1) 2 4 (M) to send a random message; upon receiving a realized
message m, the receiver follows ρ (λ2, m) 2 4 (A) to play a random action. We use the
function p(σ, ρ) defined below to aggregate this process.
p(σ, ρ) : T Λ1 Λ2 ! 4 (A) , (20)
p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [E] =
Z
M
[ρ (λ2, m) [E]] σ (t, λ1) (dm) , 8E  A.
Definition 6 For any valid language-barrier game (Λ, π), we say a valid strategy profile
[σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] ,
12For the correlated-noise version of noisy talk, it is obvious that it is welfare dominated by mediation,
but a ranking with independent language barriers remains unavailable. The difficulty is that when noise
is independent, it can be regarded as (non-strategic) language types of the sender which are independent
of payoff states, but when noise is correlated with messages, the independence between noise and payoff
states fails.
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is a language-barrier equilibrium if




u1 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u1 (t, a) p(σ
0, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [dλ2 j t, λ1]  0,




u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ
0) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [(dt, dλ1) j λ2]  0.
Furthermore, we say it is an independent-language-barrier equilibrium, if t 2 T and λ 2 Λ are
independently distributed according to π.
4.2 Welfare comparison
In this section, we assume M = R and compare the welfare induced by different notions
of equilibrium. As mentioned before, Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009)
and Blume and Board (2010) consider the canonical Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting
with quadratic utility, where, in any mediation equilibrium, the sender’s expected utility
differs from the receiver’s expected utility by a constant determined by the “bias.” In that
setting, it is without loss of generality to compare only the sender’s (or the receiver’s)
expected utility in different equilibria. However, in the general communication model
we study here, this simple property no longer holds. We thus introduce a generic social
welfare function Φ : RI  ! R to aggregate players’ utility. That is, if every player
i 2 I gets expected utility xi in a given equilibrium, we say this equilibrium achieves




. Then, for a fixed social welfare function Φ, let ΦM, ΦN,
ΦLB, ΦILB denote the supremum of the social welfare achieved by equilibria in each of
our possible protocols (i.e., mediation, noisy talk, language barriers, and independent
language barriers, respectively). We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 For any social welfare function Φ, we have
ΦLB  ΦM  ΦILB  ΦN.
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The idea of the proof of Theorem 2 is to show that equilibria with language barriers,
mediation, independent language barriers and noisy talk correspond to a series of increas-
ingly restrictive incentive compatibility conditions in that order. The proof is available in
Appendix A.3. In Giovannoni and Xiong (2018), we provide an example of ΦLB > ΦM
and another in which ΦILB > ΦN.13 The latter implies that the ΦM = ΦILB = ΦN ranking
in Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) and Blume and Board (2010) does not
generalize.
5 Literature Review
The literature on strategic communication is very large but in almost all of this literature,
the assumption is that language ability is never an issue.14 A significant exception is
Farrell (1993), where the issue of how exactly information is transmitted is taken seriously
but there is a “rich language assumption”, which excludes language barriers, and the
crucial restriction is that messages come with some intrinsic meaning. Thus, for Farrell
(1993), the restriction is not that players cannot use or understand some messages but
rather that, whenever credible, messages should be taken literally.
Still, a few authors have argued that language is necessarily too coarse for com-
munication in certain environments. For example, Arrow (1975) discusses the reasons of
organizational codes and both Crémer, Garicano, and Prat (2007) and Sobel (2015) model
such codes by using a setting where messages are too few to avoid ambiguity. While
13In the latter example, we construct an independent-language-barrier equilibrium which achieves al-
most full revelation. To achieve the same utility with noisy-talk, there should be enough noise to soften the
conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver. However, noise does not carry any information re-
garding payoff states, and hence, it brings significant deadweight losses in welfare, because upon receiving
noise, the receiver must take an action without information regarding payoff states. These two forces go
in opposite directions, and in this example, the latter dominates the former, so that ΦILB > ΦN . Whether
ΦM > ΦILB in some environments or ΦM = ΦILB for all environments remains an open question.
14Part of this literature introduces frictions in communication, but these are never interpreted as lan-
guage barriers. For example, beginning with Milgrom (1981), there is significant amount of work that
considers communication when messages are (possibly costless) evidence so that lying is not allowed. Sim-
ilarly, in Kartik (2009) lying is costly. Chen (2011) and Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) consider the
case of naive receivers, so that they face cognitive limitations, rather than language barriers.
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our results suggest that multi-dimensional communication can overcome all such issues,
there may be reasons in those environments, such as complexity or the time needed to
develop and understand such messages, that pose substantial limits on how much can
be done with them. The closest work to ours is Blume and Board (2013) which introduce
the notion of language types and use it to describe language barriers. We address differ-
ent issues, however, as Blume and Board (2013) focus on indeterminacy of meaning in
communication.15 They consider common-interest games and show that, for any fixed
game without language barriers, the most efficient equilibrium of a similar game with
language-type space Λ (and 1-dimensional communication) displays indeterminacy of
meaning, if Λ satisfies a full-support assumption. We, on the other hand, study the welfare
effects of language barriers in strategic communication. Furthermore, our results do not
have direct implications for those of Blume and Board (2013) and vice-versa.16
Furthermore, we should note that Blume (2018) extends the Blume and Board (2013)
analysis by looking at the issues raised by language barriers in a sender-receiver common-
interest context where the sender still has private information about her language type
but there is no common prior on it. We do not focus on higher-order uncertainty.17 As
discussed, in our paper we also look at whether particular language barriers can improve
upon communication in non-common interest settings. A few papers have particular rel-
evance to our work here. Krishna and Morgan (2004) show that more (Pareto) efficient
equilibria may be obtained by allowing for the informed sender and uninformed receiver
to exchange messages at a first stage and then allowing the sender to send a second mes-
sage, i.e. a conversation. The N-dimensional communication in our setting should not be
interpreted as a conversation because the one-way communication takes place in a sin-
gle stage, compared to the two-way and multi-stage communication in a conversation.
15Indeterminacies of meaning arise when, in the presence of language barriers, players’s equilibrium
strategies are such that they would want to deviate if they knew their opponent’s language type.
16For a common-interest game, Corollary 1 in Appendix B.1 states that given any language barriers,
we can (arbitrarily) approximate full efficiency with N-dimensional communication for large enough N.
Full efficiency would guarantee determinacy of meaning, but for any given N only approximate efficiency
is achieved and so indeterminacies cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, such indeterminacies are not
guaranteed to exist either, because our regularity conditions on how language barriers (i.e., Λ) are extended
to N-dimensional communication imply that the full support assumption (a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition) in Blume and Board (2013) will be violated.
17However, Theorem 1 holds for language-ex-post as well as language-interim equilibria so it would still
hold in situations of higher order uncertainty.
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Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) show that the exogenously given possibility of an
error in communication actually improves communication in equilibrium, while in our
setting it is exogenous language barriers that provide such results. In fact, Goltsman,
Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) provide an upper bound on ex-ante welfare if me-
diation is introduced in the model and show that conversations (sometimes) and noisy
talk (always) can reach, but not surpass such a bound.18 Blume and Board (2010) study
language barriers under the assumption of independence between language types and
payoff states and argue that the welfare bound can be reached by language barriers. We
extend these results to a class of much more general communication games and provide a
linear ranking amongst all of these communication protocols. In particular, we show that
under the independence assumption, but in this general setting, the optimal language
barriers will always do no worse than the optimal noisy talk. Indeed, in Giovannoni and
Xiong (2018) we provide an example where the optimal independent-language-barrier
equilibrium does strictly better than the optimal noisy-talk equilibrium, which implies
that, in general and in contrast with the conclusions drawn in Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov,
and Squintani (2009) and Blume and Board (2010), noisy communication cannot always
achieve the welfare bound obtained through mediated communication. We also go be-
yond the independence assumption between payoff states and language types and show
that the optimal language barriers can do better than mediation, whereas a comparison
with arbitration cannot be made without specifying the form of arbitration or the wel-
fare function.19 Finally, Blume, Lai, and Lim (2017) find some laboratory evidence that
randomized responses increase information transmission.
Some of our communication protocols in this latter part of the paper correspond to
some of the equilibrium notions developed in the literature on correlated equilibria in
games of incomplete information. It is easy to check, for example, that mediation corre-
sponds to a communication equilibrium in Forges (1993). For language barriers, however,
things are not so simple. At an intuitive level, it is clear that language barriers bring cor-
relation to the communication between the sender and the receiver, but it is not obvious
how the restrictions imposed by language barriers (with or without independence) could
18Ganguly and Ray (2011) argue that any noisy communication protocol requires a larger set of messages
than those used in the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. They show that simple mediation,
where no more messages can be used than in the corresponding Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting, does
not improve on such setting.
19See Giovannoni and Xiong (2018) for details.
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be translated to any notion of correlated equilibrium.20 This implies that all of the results
obtained here cannot be established by mapping our equilibrium notions to those in the
correlated equilibrium literature. Thus, our results can be seen as providing a (further)
link between the literature on cheap talk with different forms of commitment or noise and
the literature of correlation in games of incomplete information, but the full implication
of such links is still awaiting a more systematic analysis.
6 Conclusion
We conclude the paper by discussing some features of our model and some potential alter-
native ways to model language barriers. In our N-dimensional communication, we start
with primitives defined in 1-dimensional messages, and then extend to N-dimensional
messages. One point worth emphasizing is that in our protocol, the sender communi-
cates an N-dimensional message in one shot, so that the protocol cannot be interpreted
as “a conversation”. Still, one could interpret the protocol as one with 1-dimensional
communication but where the set of messages M has a structure where each available
message is a (N-dimensional) vector, with each 1-dimensional component belonging to a
common set of basic components, like an alphabet. In such interpretation, our restrictions
would be that any two messages which have the same basic components must belong to
the same language type. The challenge with such interpretation is that of explaining why
these restrictions are the natural ones and this is beyond the scope of this paper.21
On the other hand, when we extend the restrictions implied by language barriers
on M to language barriers on MN, we do so in a “natural” way in the sense that such
extensions take the original language barriers literally. So, a sender who only understands
messages in λ1 is only able to send messages only in (λ1)
N while a receiver is only able
20Language barriers introduce exogenous constraints on what messages the sender can send and the re-
ceiver can understand. In particular, there may exist a language-barrier equilibrium in which such barriers
forbid a sender to deviate to a particular message which is more profitable, and similarly, such barriers
forbid a receiver to deviate to a better strategy that is not measurable for her language type. Such prof-
itable deviations are allowed in correlated equilibria, and as a result, language-barrier equilibria cannot be
translated to a notion of correlated equilibrium.
21Also, how should we interpret a dimension in a message, if a message is taken as a minimal unit in
communication?
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to distinguish x, y 2 MN if x λ2 y. Clearly, these are strong restrictions but one could
assume weaker restrictions and our results would still hold.22
Finally, we may ask whether there are other, simpler, protocols which might be
equally effective as N-dimensional communication. For instance, it would seem too
strong to require all messages to be N-dimensional, instead of allowing for messages of
any dimensional size, up to N, because the latter should be simpler and, maybe, equally
effective: players may use the length of a message to transmit information. In fact, that
such protocol would be an improvement over ours is not so obvious. First of all, note
that if we try to model real-life communication, then resources (e.g. time, effort) will be
limited and this implies that, necessarily, the number of messages that can be transmitted
must be finite and bounded and the “N” in our protocol models this upper bound. Given
this, a protocol that allows for varied dimensional sizes can always be transformed into
our protocol by adding to the latter a message (e.g. “silence”) that is available to all lan-
guage types of the sender. Thus, it is without loss of generality to consider N-dimensional
messages with a fixed N. Furthermore, given the upper bound “N”, only finite messages
can be transmitted by counting the dimensions of a message. As a result, infinite-message
equilibria would not be effectively replicated under the modified protocol, i.e., Theorem
3 in Appendix B.2 would not hold.
But even for finite-message equilibria, counting message length encounters a prac-
tical difficulty: a language type can easily count the length of a message if he fully under-
stands the message, but he can hardly do it otherwise. Therefore, in presence of language
barriers, counting message length is not an effective scheme. In our proof of Theorems 1
and 3, we (implicitly) assume receivers have the ability to count but such an assumption
is for notational simplicity only, and can be dropped. It can be easily shown that it is al-
ways possible to design messages where each receiver type is assigned a unique opening
and/or ending portion (which such type understands) so that any such type can scan the
message without counting and still know where the message addressed to him is.
22For example, suppose f, #g \ λ = ?. In our model, when N = 2, the receiver cannot distinguish
between messages (, ) , (, #) , (#, ) and (#, #). But, as pointed out by a refeee, it is conceivable that a
receiver that does not understand the difference between  and # may still be able to recognize repeating
patterns. Thus, even though he cannot distinguish (, ) from (#, #), and (, #) from (#, ), he may be able
to distinguish any message in f(, ) , (#, #)g from any message in f(, #) , (#, )g. Clearly, in this latter case,
the extension to multi-dimensional language barriers is less restrictive than the one we assume in the paper.
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A Additional Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall N > 3+ jΛ1j. Label the elements in Λ1 as λ(1)1 , λ
(2)
1 , ..., λ
(K)
1 , where K = jΛ1j < N.
For each λ(k)1 2 Λ1 with k  K, we have λ
(k)
1 \ λ2 6= ? and
λ(k)1   2, due to (4) and
(5). Thus, we fix some
m(k) 2 λ(k)1 \ λ2, (23)
and some em(k) 2 λ(k)1 nm(k)o, i.e., m(k) 6= em(k). Note that
m(k) λ2 em(k), (24)
whether em(k) 2 λ2 or em(k) /2 λ2.









l=1 2 MN such that ml =
8<: m(k), if l = k;em(k), otherwise.
That is, type λ(k)1 uses m
(k) to denote “yes” and em(k) for “no”. Furthermore, the sender






to one element in Λ1,
and reveals whether her language type is that element in the associated dimension. Pre-
cisely, λ(k)1 says “yes” (i.e., m
(k)) in the k-th dimension, and “no” (i.e., em(k)) in all other
dimensions.












, as needed in (7). By the definition of























= [ bml]Nl=1 =  bmk0 = m(k0),  bml = em(k0)l 6=k0

.
Consider two cases: (1) m(k) 6= em(k0) and (2) m(k) = em(k0). In case (1), m(k) 6= em(k0) and
m(k) 2 λ2 (by (23)) imply
mk = m(k) λ2 em(k0) = bmk,
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i.e., in the k-th dimension, mk λ2 bmk, which further implies Υλ2 hλ(k)1 i λ2 Υλ2 hλ(k0)1 i.




 fk, k0g. Then,
(24) implies
mk00 = em(k) λ2 m(k) = em(k0) = bmk00 ,
i.e., in the k00-th dimension, mk00 λ2 bmk00 , which further implies Υλ2 hλ(k)1 i λ2 Υλ2 hλ(k0)1 i

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix any (λ1, λ2) 2 Λ. Recall λ1 \ λ2 6= ? and jλ1j  2. Thus, we fix some m 2 λ1 \ λ2,
and some em 2 λ1 fmg, i.e., m 6= em. Note that
m λ2 em, (25)
whether em 2 λ2 or em /2 λ2.
Recall bN > E (σ,ρ) by (8). Label the elements in E (σ,ρ) as m(1), m(2), ..., m(K),
where K =
E (σ,ρ) < bN. Then, define Γ(λ1,λ2) : E (σ,ρ)  ! (λ1) bN as follows. For each








bN such that ml =
8<: m, if l = k;em, otherwise.
That is, type λ1 use m to denote “yes” and em for “no”. Furthermore, λ1 associates each of




to one element in E (σ,ρ), and reveals
whether she intends to send that element in the associated dimension. Precisely, to send
the message m(k) 2 E (σ,ρ), λi says “yes” (i.e., m) in the k-th dimension, and “no” (i.e., em)
in all other dimensions.









, as needed in (9). By the















= [ bml] bNl=1 = h bmk0 = m, ( bml = em)l 6=k0i .
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Since k 6= k0, (25) implies
mk = m λ2 em = bmk,
i.e. in the k-th dimension, mk λ2 bmk, which further implies Γ(λ1,λ2) hm(k)i λ2 Γ(λ1,λ2) hm(k0)i

A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first introduce the notion of weak language-barrier equilibrium, which differs from
language-barrier equilibria (resp. independent-language-barrier equilibria) because in
the former we remove the assumption
jλij  2, 8 (i, λ) 2 I Λ. (26)
That is, every language type must be endowed with at least two messages in any language-
barrier equilibrium, but language types in a weak-language-barrier equilibrium may be
endowed with just one message. Clearly, a language-barrier equilibrium is a weak language-
barrier equilibrium. Conversely, Lemma 3 below establishes that for any weak language-
barrier equilibrium, there is an outcome-equivalent language-barrier equilibrium. Be-
cause of this, it is without loss of generality to focus on weak language-barrier equilibria.
Given this, the proof of Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 4, 5 and 6.
Lemma 3 For any weak language-barrier equilibrium, there exists an outcome-equivalent language-
barrier equilibrium. Furthermore, for any weak independent-language-barrier equilibrium, there
exists an outcome-equivalent independent-language-barrier equilibrium.
Proof Fix any valid language-barrier game (Λ, π), and any weak language-barrier equi-
librium,
[σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] .
Recall M = R. Pick any disjoint M ( M) and M ( M) which are both homeomor-









γ : M  ! M,
γ : M  ! M,
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denote the homeomorphisms, and let γ 1 and γ 1 denote the inverse functions.
Define a new valid language-barrier game
eΛ, eπ where
eΛ1 = fγ (λ1) [ γ (λ1) : λ1 2 Λ1g ;eΛ2 = fγ (λ2) [ γ (λ2) : λ2 2 Λ2g ;eπ (E) = π (f[t, λ1, λ2] : [t, γ (λ1) [ γ (λ1) , γ (λ2) [ γ (λ2)] 2 Eg) , 8E  T  2M  2M,
i.e., any sender language type λ1 is transformed into a new type γ (λ1)[ γ (λ1)which
contains two copies of the original type, with the first copy transformed from λ1 via γ
and the second copy from λ1 via γ; a similar construction applies to the receiver’s lan-
guage types; the new prior eπ inherits the distribution from the original prior π.
For any µ 2 4 (M), define γ (µ) 2 4 (M) as




, 8E  M,
i.e., for any random message generated by µ, we transform it to a message in M via γ,
and γ (µ) is the distribution of the transformed message from µ.
For each λ2 2 Λ2 such that λ2 $ M, fix any mλ2 2 Mλ2. Furthermore, if λ2 = M,
fix any mλ2 2 M. The sole purpose of construction of mλ2 is for the measurability (with
respect to λ2) of eρ defined below. We now define the outcome-equivalent language-barrier
equilibrium. heσ : T  eΛ1 ! 4 (M) , eρ : eΛ2  M ! 4 (A)i ,
eσ [t, γ (λ1) [ γ (λ1)] = γ (σ [t, λ1]) ,

















That is, a new sender’s type γ (λ1)[γ (λ1) follows the strategy σ [t, λ1] of the old type
λ1, but transforms the (random) message into a message in M via γ; a new receiver’s
type γ (λ2) [ γ (λ2) first decodes the messages in M and M via γ 1 and γ 1,











By the definition of eΛ1 and eΛ2, the sender sends messages only in M and M,
because γ (M) = M and γ (M) = M. Second, the receiver treats M and M as
the transformed copies of the same set M (via γ and γ, respectively). Hence, it is with-
out loss of generality for the sender to send messages only in M.23 Given this, [eσ, eρ]
just replicates [σ, ρ], and [eσ, eρ] inherits the incentive compatibility properties of [σ, ρ].
Therefore, [eσ, eρ] is an outcome-equivalent language-barrier equilibrium. A similar argu-
ment applies to weak independent-language-barrier equilibria
Lemma 4 For any noisy talk equilibrium, there exists an outcome-equivalent independent-language-
barrier equilibrium.
Proof In light of Lemma 3, it is without loss of generality for us to focus on weak
independent-language-barrier equilibria. Fix any noisy-talk game (ε, ξ) 2 [0, 1]4 (M),
and any noisy-talk equilibrium ([s : T  ! 4 (M)] , [r : M  ! 4 (A)]) in the game. De-
fine a language-barrier game (Λ, π), such that the random vectors defined on T and Λ
are independent under π, and


























= ε ξ [fm : λm 2 Eg] , 8E  2M fMg .
That is, the receiver understands all messages in M; with probability 1  ε, the sender
understand all messages in M, and with probability ε, the sender is endowed with a
single message; conditional on the probability-ε event, the distribution follows ξ, with
fmg replacing m.
Then, we define a weak independent-language-barrier equilibrium
[σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] ,
23Any message in M has a corresponding message M which plays the same role.
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such that for every (t, m) 2 T  M,
σ

t, λ1 = λM

= s (t) ,





= r (m) ,
where δm denotes the Dirac measure on m. Clearly, incentive compatibility for every λm 
fmg is satisfied. Then, the incentive compatibility of the sender’s language type λM  M
and the receiver’s language type λM  M in [σ, ρ] inherits the incentive compatibility
of the sender and the receiver in the noisy-talk equilibrium (s, r), respectively. I.e., [σ, ρ]
is an outcome-equivalent weak independent-language-barrier equilibrium. Finally, by
Lemma 3, an outcome-equivalent independent-language-barrier equilibrium exists
Lemma 5 For any independent-language-barrier equilibrium, there exists an outcome-equivalent
mediation equilibrium.
Proof Fix any valid language-barrier game (Λ, π), and any independent-language-barrier
equilibrium
[σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] ,
Recall p(σ, ρ) : T Λ1 Λ2 ! 4 (A) defined in (20):
p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [E] =
Z
M
[ρ (λ2, m) [E]] σ (t, λ1) (dm) , 8E  A.
i.e., p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) is the ex-post action distribution induced by [σ, ρ], given (t, λ1, λ2).
Then, define
P (σ, ρ) : T ! 4 (A) ,




p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [E]
i
πΛ [dλ1, dλ2] , 8E  A, (27)
i.e., P (σ, ρ) (t) is the ex-post action distribution induced by [σ, ρ], given t. We now show
that P (σ, ρ) : T ! 4 (A) defined above is a mediation equilibrium. First, since [σ, ρ] is a
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language-barrier equilibrium, (21) in Definition 6 implies




u1 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u1 (t, a) p(σ
0, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [dλ2 j t, λ1]  0,
(28)





u1 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u1 (t, a) p(σ
0, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [dλ2 j λ1]  0.
(29)
Given the definition of P (σ, ρ) in (27), if we integrate (29) over Λ1, we getZ
a2A
u1 [t, a]P (σ, ρ) (t) [da] 
Z
a2A
u1 [t, a]P (σ
0, ρ) (t) [da] , 8t, σ0. (30)
Finally, for every t0 2 T, consider σ0 (t, λ1)  σ (t0, λ1), and (30) becomesZ
a2A
u1 [t, a]P (σ, ρ) (t) [da] 
Z
a2A




[da] , 8t, t0 2 T,
i.e., (15) in Definition 4 holds.
Second, since [σ, ρ] is a language-barrier equilibrium, (22) in Definition 6 implies




u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ
0) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [(dt, dλ1) j λ2]  0.
(31)




u2 [t, a]P (σ, ρ) (t) (da)




u2 (t, a)P (σ, ρ
0) (t) (da)
35πT [dt] , 8ρ0,
which further implies




u2 [t, a]P (σ, ρ) (t) (da)




u2 [t, ι (a)]P (σ, ρ) (t) (da)
35πT [dt] ,
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i.e., (16) in Definition 4 holds. Therefore, P (σ, ρ) : T ! 4 (A) is a mediation equilibrium
Lemma 6 For any mediation equilibrium, there exists an outcome-equivalent language-barrier
equilibrium.
Proof Fix any mediation equilibrium [p : T  ! 4 (A)] so that, in particular,




u2 [t, a] p (t) (da)




u2 [t, ι (a)] p (t) (da)
35πT [dt] . (32)
In light of Lemma 3, it is without loss of generality for us to focus on weak language-
barrier equilibria. Recall M = A = R. Define a language-barrier game (Λ, π), such
that
λM  M and λa  fag , 8a 2 A = M;

















πT [dt] , 8E  T  2M  2M,
i.e., the receiver has a unique language type λM  M, who understands all messages;
the sender’s language types have the form λa  fag for a 2 A = M; conditional on
payoff state t, the distribution π

λa, λM j t

inherits the distribution from p (t) [a], with
λa  fag replacing a.
Define [σ : T Λ1 ! 4 (M) , ρ : Λ2  M ! 4 (A)] as follows




M, m = a
i
= δa, 8a 2 A = M,
where δa is the Dirac measure on a. Clearly, incentive compatibility of each sender’s
language type λa  fag is satisfied. The incentive compatibility of the receiver follows
from (32). More specifically, p(σ, ρ) : TΛ1Λ2 ! 4 (A) as defined in (20) has the value
p(σ, ρ)
h




And hence, (32) implies




u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ) (t, λ1, λ2) [da] 
Z
a2A
u2 (t, a) p(σ, ρ
0) (t, λ1, λ2) [da]
1Aπ [(dt, dλ1) j λ2]  0,
i.e., incentive compatibility of the receiver is satisfied, and [σ, ρ] is an outcome-equivalent
weak language-barrier equilibria. Finally, by Lemma 3, an outcome-equivalent independent-
language-barrier equilibrium exists.
B Additional Material on N-Dimensional Communication
B.1 Implications of Theorem 1
One immediate implication of Theorem 1 is that any language barriers in the canonical
Crawford and Sobel (1982) cheap-talk model can be overcome. In that model, there ex-
ists a maximally-revealing equilibrium, in which finite messages are transmitted. Hence,
all equilibria in the model are finite-message equilibria, and Theorem 1 immediately im-
plies that all of them can be replicated whatever language barriers there are, if multi-
dimensional communication is allowed.
A second, less immediate, implication focuses on the setting studied by Blume and
Board (2013), which is that of a common-interest sender-receiver game. Specifically, we
assume the following:
Assumption 2 (common-interest sender-receiver game) u1  u2  u is continuous and T
and A are compact metric spaces.
We use u to denote the common utility function for both players. In this setting,
Blume and Board (2013) prove that indeterminacies of meaning are inevitably induced by
language barriers under 1-dimensional communication, which implies, as a by-product,
that there will not be efficient equilibria.24. However, Proposition 1 below shows that, in
24Indeterminancies of meaning imply inefficiency, or equivalently, efficiency implies determinancy of
meaning.
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the absence of language barriers, approximate efficiency can always be achieved if there
are sufficiently many, albeit finite, messages.





, there exists a positive integer K such that










2 G, which satisfies Assumption 2, we
have
jMj  K =)
















[maxa2A u (t, a)]πT (dt) is the maximal utility that players can possibly










Then, Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 together imply the following Corollary 1. The proofs
of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 follow immediately below.25
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For any ε > 0 and any


T, Λ, πT, A, (ui)i2I

,




M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui)i2I , N

in which N  N and the marginal distribution of π on T is
πT.
Proof of Proposition 1 We use the following two lemmas to prove Proposition 1.
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. For any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that





maxa2A u (t, a)  u [t, a]
 < ε, 8a 2 arg maxa2A u  t0, a . (33)
25Theorem 1 assumes that language types and payoff states are independently distributed. For common-
interest games, however, in previous versions of this paper we showed that even in the absence of indepen-
dence, with a N-dimensional protocol there exist ε-equilibria that achieve almost-efficiency.
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Proof Since u is continuous and T, A are compact, u is uniformly continuous. Then, by
Berge’s Maximum Theorem, φ (t)  maxa2A u (t, a) is continuous on t 2 T. Since T is
compact, φ (t) is uniformly continuous, and hence,





maxa2A u (t, a) maxa2A u  t0, a
 < ε2, (34)
The uniform continuity of u implies






u (t, a) maxa2A u  t0, a
 = u (t, a)  u  t0, a < ε2, 8a 2 arg maxa2A u  t0, a .
Then, (34) and (35) imply





maxa2A u (t, a)  u (t, a)
 < ε, 8a 2 arg maxa2A u  t0, a .
This completes the proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 8 Suppose jMj < ∞. For any game G =
D








Assumption 2, there exists an optimal equilibrium (σ, ρ) in G such that U (σ, ρ)  U (σ, ρ)
for any strategy profile (σ, ρ) in G.
Proof Suppose jMj = n. Define a function, ψ : An  ! R as follows.









First, we show ψ is uniformly continuous, i.e.,
8ε > 0, 9δ > 0, such that (36)
jbak   eakj < δ, 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng =) jψ (ba1, ...,ban)  ψ (ea1, ...,ean)j < ε.
By uniform continuity of u,
8ε > 0, 9δ > 0, such that (37)a0   a00 < δ =) u  t, a0  u  t, a00 < ε, 8t 2 T.
33
Fix any (ba1, ...,ban) and (ea1, ...,ean) such that maxk2f1,2,...,ng jbak   eakj < δ. For each t 2 T, fix
any k (t) 2 arg maxk2f1,...,ng u (t,bak). We thus have



















 < ε, (39)
where (39) is implied by (37). Furthermore, by the definition of ψ (ea1, ...,ean), we have





t,eak(t)iπT (dt) . (40)
Then, (38), (39) and (40) imply
8ε > 0, 9δ > 0, such that (41)
jbak   eakj < δ, 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng =) ψ (ea1, ...,ean)  ψ (ba1, ...,ban)  ε.
If we change the roles of (ea1, ...,ean) and (ba1, ...,ban), and repeat the analysis, we get
8ε > 0, 9δ0 > 0, such that (42)
jbak   eakj < δ0 , 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng =) ψ (ba1, ...,ban)  ψ (ea1, ...,ean)  ε.
Therefore, (41) and (42) imply (36), i.e., ψ is uniformly continuous.
Second, there exists
(a1 , ..., a

n) 2 arg max
(a1,...,an)2An
ψ (a1, ..., an) , (43)
















πT (dt) , 8 (a1, ..., an) 2 An.
Third, recall that there are jMj = n messages. Label the elements in M as m1, ..., mn, i.e.,
fm1, ..., mng. For any fixed strategy profile (σ, ρ), let ak 2 A denote the action taken by
the receiver upon getting mk under (σ, ρ). Then, the expected utility of the players under








Finally, (a1 , ..., a

n) as defined in (43) corresponds to an equilibrium, denoted by














, 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng .
Then, define










is a partition of T, and each ak is the optimal action for every
t 2 Ek. Thus, the following strategy profile is an equilibrium.24 sender’s strategy: send mk if and only if t 2 Ek, 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng .
receiver’s strategy: play ak if and only if he receives mk, 8k 2 f1, 2, ..., ng .
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The incentive compatibility of the sender is implied by the definition of Ek and the incen-
tive compatibility of the receiver is implied by (a1 , ..., a

n) 2 arg max(a1,...,an)2An ψ (a1, ..., an).
The last two points show the existence of an equilibrium (σ, ρ) such that U (σ, ρ) 
U (σ, ρ) for any strategy profile (σ, ρ). This completes the proof of Lemma 8
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 1. Fix any game satisfying
Assumption 2 and any ε > 0. By Lemma 7, there exists δ > 0 such that





maxa2A u (t, a)  u [t, a]
 < ε, 8a 2 arg maxa2A u  t0, a . (44)
Since T is compact, it is totally bounded. Hence, there exists a positive integer K, such
that T can be partitioned by fE1, ..., EKg and




< δ , 8k 2 f1, ..., Kg . (45)

























where the inequality follows from (44) and (45).
Suppose jMj  K. Then, the expected utility ∑
k2f1,...,Kg
R
t2Ek u (t, ak)πT (dt) can be
achieved in a strategy profile, i.e., fix K messages, m1, ..., mK; the sender sends mk if and
only if t 2 Ek; the receiver plays ak if and only if he receives mk. By Lemma 8, an optimal
equilibrium exists, and denote it by (σ, ρ), and hence












πT (dt)  U (σ, ρ) . (48)










which completes the proof
Proof of Corollary 1 Fix any ε > 0 and any


T, Λ, πT, A, (ui)i2I

. Consider any game G =

M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui)i2I , N

satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 and the marginal distribution
of π on T is πT. We prove Corollary 1 in 3 steps.









 < ε, (49)
where M  bM and bM is an arbitrary set which contains sufficiently many messages. Note
that bG is a game with 1-dimensional communication and no language barriers.
Step 2: by Theorem 1, a positive integer N exists, such that, in any game eG =D bM, T, Λ, π, A, (ui)i2I , NE similar to bG with N  N , there exists an equilibrium (eσ,eρ) ofeG that is outcome-equivalent to (σ, ρ).
Step 3: G differs from eG only in the message set, i.e., M in G and bM in eG. In particu-
lar, the set of language types, Λ, is the same in both G and eG, i.e., λi  M  bM for every
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λi. As a result, (eσ,eρ) remains an equilibrium in G, if N  N , because none of senders’ and
receivers’ language types (in Λ) understand the additional messages in bMM (i.e., these
additional messages are not used in (eσ,eρ)). Finally, since (eσ,eρ) is outcome-equivalent to
(σ, ρ), (49) completes the proof.
B.2 Infinite-message equilibria
If we consider general communication games beyond the canonical Crawford and Sobel
(1982) cheap-talk model, infinite messages may be transmitted in an equilibrium (σ, ρ)
under no language barriers, i.e.,
E (σ,ρ) = ∞. We extend Theorem 1 to such setups. To
achieve this, we need the following necessary technical assumption.E (σ,ρ)  λ1 \ λ2 , 8 (λ1, λ2) 2 Λ. (50)
To effectively transmit equilibrium messages from λ1 to λ2, the sender must use the mes-
sages in λ1
\






under N-dimensional communication, because, otherwise, λ2 cannot understand. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to showλ1 \ λ2 > ∞ =) λ1 \ λ2 = hλ1 \ λ2iN . (51)






must have (weakly) larger cardi-
nality than E (σ,ρ), which together with (51), implies the necessity of (50).
Using an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can show the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. For any equilibrium (σ, ρ) in any game without






, A, (ui)i2I , 1
E
and any language barriers Λ, a positive
integer N exists, such that in any similar game G =


M, T, Λ, π, A, (ui)i2I , N

satisfying
N  N and E (σ,ρ)  λ1 \ λ2 , 8 (λ1, λ2) 2 Λ,
there exists an equilibrium (σ, ρ) of G that is outcome-equivalent to (σ, ρ).
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Proof Fix any game G without language barriers and any equilibrium (σ, ρ) in G,














(σ : T ! M)i2I , (ρ : M ! A)i2I

.
Given E (σ,ρ)  λ1 \ λ2 , 8 (λ1, λ2) 2 Λ,








 jΛ2j, where N is defined in (6). We now define a strategy profile
(σ, ρ), and show it is an equilibrium in the N -dimensional communication game which
is similar to G.
The sender’s strategy: let mλ2 denote the message intended from the sender to type
λ2 of the receiver. For every (t, λ1) 2 T Λ1, define















The receiver’s strategy: Fix any
et 2 T.
Upon receiving the intended message mλ2 from the sender, type λ2 of the receiver uses








σ ( t ) ,
if there exists (t, λ1) 2 T Λ1 such that
mλ2 =






  et  , otherwise.




λ22Λ2 , where mλ2 is the message from the sender to type λ2 of the
receiver, define






, 8λ2 2 Λ2.
The rest of the argument is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3.2.2
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